NONE 20260725161536889 cmho/cmho content-registration-form@crossref.org content-registration-form European Archives of Social Sciences 3061-9572 Hakan Çora Onbeş Kasım Kıbrıs University https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5780-549X The April 2025 conflict between India and Pakistan represents the most serious confrontation between the two nuclear-armed rivals since the Pulwama–Balakot crisis of 2019. This study offers a multidimensional analysis of the crisis—military, political, economic, and humanitarian—grounded in nuclear deterrence theory. Drawing on Scott Sagan’s organizational failure model and Kenneth Waltz’s deterrence optimism, the study evaluates whether nuclear weapons contributed to crisis stability or, conversely, incentivized aggressive risk-taking under conditions of uncertainty. The research uses qualitative scenario analysis supported by primary and secondary data including official statements, international media reports, satellite imagery assessments, and peer-reviewed academic literature. Findings indicate that although nuclear deterrence prevented the outbreak of a large-scale interstate war, the crisis exhibited clear indicators of instability: intelligence failures, organizational biases, militant provocation, and heightened alert postures consistent with Sagan’s pessimistic predictions. Economically, the crisis generated asymmetric disruptions, hitting Pakistan’s fragile markets more severely. Politically, it intensified domestic polarization and undermined fragile peace-building measures. Humanitarian impacts were profound, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, where displacement, infrastructure damage, and restricted humanitarian access exacerbated the crisis. The study concludes that the April 2025 conflict demonstrates the fragility of deterrence stability in South Asia, which remains vulnerable to inadvertent escalation, militant spoilers, and opaque nuclear command systems. Policy recommendations include strengthening crisis communication channels, institutionalizing nuclear risk-reduction centers, and enhancing bilateral early-warning mechanisms. Nisan 2025’te Hindistan ile Pakistan arasında yaşanan kriz, iki nükleer silaha sahip devlet arasındaki ilişkilerde 2019 Pulwama–Balakot geriliminden bu yana görülen en ciddi tırmanma olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu çalışma, söz konusu krizi askeri, siyasi, ekonomik ve insani boyutlarıyla çok katmanlı bir analiz çerçevesinde incelemekte ve nükleer caydırıcılık literatüründeki iki temel yaklaşımı—Kenneth Waltz’ın caydırıcılık iyimserliği ile Scott Sagan’ın örgütsel hata ve kurumsal kırılganlık modeli—karşılaştırmalı olarak değerlendirmektedir. Araştırma, yapılandırılmış nitel vaka analizi ve süreç izleme yöntemine dayanmaktadır. Resmî devlet açıklamaları, uluslararası medya raporları, Birleşmiş Milletler durum değerlendirmeleri, savunma analiz platformları ve ekonomik piyasa verileri sistematik biçimde toplanmış; tematik kodlama ve analitik matris yöntemiyle değerlendirilmiştir. Bulgular, nükleer caydırıcılığın geniş çaplı konvansiyonel savaşı engellediğini; ancak istihbarat hataları, örgütsel önyargılar, militan aktörlerin provokatif eylemleri, kısa füze uçuş süreleri ve hızlı seferberlik döngüleri nedeniyle krizin belirgin bir istikrarsızlık potansiyeli taşıdığını göstermektedir. Ekonomik etkiler asimetrik biçimde ortaya çıkmış; özellikle Pakistan’ın kırılgan mali yapısı döviz dalgalanmaları ve yatırım çıkışları nedeniyle daha ağır etkilenmiştir. İnsani açıdan ise Cemmu–Keşmir bölgesinde yerinden edilme, altyapı tahribatı ve insani erişim kısıtları yaşanmış; bu durum uzun vadeli toplumsal kırılganlıkları derinleştirmiştir. Sonuç olarak, çalışma Güney Asya’da nükleer caydırıcılığın stratejik düzeyde savaşı önleyici bir işlev görse de operasyonel ve alt-konvansiyonel düzeylerde kırılgan ve sürdürülebilirliği sınırlı bir istikrar ürettiğini ortaya koymaktadır. 04 27 2026 e262007 10.35365/eass.26.1.07 https://eassjournal.com/index.php/pub/article/view/92/105 Al Jazeera. (2025, April 24). India and Pakistan near strategic standoff after Pahalgam attack in Kashmir. Retrieved 3 August 2025, from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/24/india-and-pakistan-head-towards-a-strategic-standoff-after-pahalgam-attack Azad, T., & Dewey, K. (2023). Assessing the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme. Defense & Security Analysis, 39(4), 417–443. 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